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Reviewed by Chris Bronk, University of Houston
Did the National Security Agency, Cyber Command, and the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency succeed in blunting Russian attempts
to manipulate the U.S. 2020 national elections? It may take some time to
have a clearer picture of what happened, and there have many fingers
pointed in Vladimir Putin’s direction, but as of February 2021, it appears
that the U.S. government did a good job. But the Russians have made
much mayhem in cyberspace, the SolarWinds cyber incident being yet
another reminder of the Kremlin’s significant capacity for digital
espionage. Scott Jasper’s superb Russian Cyber Operations provides an
appraisal of just what the Russians have done, what they may attempt, and
how different socio-technical approaches employed by the U.S. and its
allies can do to reverse activity that does not necessarily rise to the level of
military hostilities.
Captain Jasper (USN ret’d) has produced a qualitative study that rests
upon understanding of different but interwoven cyber issues for national
security policy beginning with the Law of Armed Conflict, asymmetric
capabilities, and information and hybrid warfare. His consideration of
other dynamics in cybersecurity and related information operations and
activities, leveling more than a few critical points on U.S. responses to
Russia’s information confrontation (informatsionnoye protivoborstyo).
The final portion of Jasper’s book addresses new options for policy and
technology that may prevent Russia from repeating what I would
characterize as cyber successes either in combination with kinetic forms of
conflict or absent military violence.
Handling the thorny question of when actions by bytes may necessitate
response by bombs, in his analytic framework, Jasper asserts, quite
correctly in my opinion, that “For cyber operations to satisfy the armed
criteria of armed conflict, they would have to result in injury or death of
persons or damage or destruction of property.” His coverage of
international law and norms regarding cyber conflict leads him to a likely
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controversial claim that, “a solid international legal framework exists to
govern how the United States and other countries should respond to cyber
operations.” This does not necessarily boil down to rules of warfare, but
rather ones related to conflict, which is an evolving concept, not one frozen
and clearly codified.
If there is one thing Russia has done, it is to produce an ample number of
cyber cases, including: Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), Ukraine power
grid (2015), and NotPetya (2017). Much can be learned from Russia’s
behavior in its near abroad of former Soviet Republics. “Russia prefers to
test the thresholds of armed conflict, using cyber operations and other
ambiguous means in its asymmetric arsenal in continual ‘day-to-day’
competition with the United States and its allies,” he argues. This assertion
is demonstrated via cases tied to effective framing throughout the
diagnostic sections of Russia Cyber Operations.
Coverage of both information and hybrid warfare is conducted with nods
to both Russian strategic thinking and action. This includes a treatment of
the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ as well as its application in analyzing the
annexation of Crimea by Russian forces in 2014. Actions by Russian
military units already based there as well as arrivals from outside were
bolstered by cyber actions motivated by a desire to further, “disrupt and
destabilize Ukraine.” With this case, Jasper shows, as with the matter of
cyber action against Georgia in 2008, how cyber activity can be part of a
hybrid warfare strategy that employs force in actions that may not rise to
the level of outright military hostilities.
Attention to information warfare, in the form of Russian broad
conceptualization of how, “Cyber-enabled information operations give
Moscow a covert means,” to influence public opinion, organize protests,
and reduce the will of its opponents to resist. It is here that Jasper throws
light onto Russian doctrinal understanding of how information
confrontation can be used to influence by “informational-technical effect,”
or “information-psychological effect.” Russia clearly has a strong
command of information operations and how they may be employed
across a continuum of international affairs, both below and above the
threshold of armed conflict. The information warfare concept is applied to
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, with the facts of the case concise and
completely valid in the reviewer’s opinion.
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There is an interesting pivot into the topic of “Rational State Behavior,”
which highlights how Russia has maneuvered around Western strengths in
law and norms to achieve its goals, despite modest resources. Russia has
done what it believes it can get away with through employment of cyber
covert action and Jasper believes it will continue to do so. He is tough on
U.S. policy responses to Russia thus far. Recent White House and DoD
policy announcements regarding cyber action still have yet to “rebuild
eroded credibility” as a convincing response to Russian activity. Indeed,
Jasper argues, “the United States has failed so far to reintroduce the belief
in Russia that malicious cyber operations will not be tolerated.”
Having identified the issues regarding Russia’s employment of cyber
operations and the failures in U.S. and Western response to them, Jasper
moves to a set of strategies and frameworks commonly identified in
industry and government. This chapter feels, much its subject matter,
ambitious, but not up to the task of meeting Russian cyber forces head on.
Recent cyber incident case studies have employed the MITRE ATT&CK
framework, which can be used to clearly identify points of cybersecurity
failure in an organization. Jasper sees it as one of the mechanisms to
providing drilled or automated response to cyberattack. He also eschewed
the hype on artificial intelligence for a reasonable, straightforward
treatment of how machine learning may aid in cybersecurity efforts.
I offer a high-level critique of Prof. Jasper’s characterization of the Russian
threat as I remain unconvinced that it will be an enduring one. While
Russia’s mastery of cyber/information operations is strong, it stands on
the weakest of economic foundations. E.H. Carr’s pre-World War II
assessment of power encompasses a blend of military, informational, and
economic ingredients. Setting aside the considerable internal dissent
surrounding Alexei Navalny’s populist campaign, Russia has the shakiest
of economic footings as energy exports stand at the center of its economy,
so its cyber action is necessitated as costs preclude the sort of action that
spanned the globe during the Cold War. Perhaps that will change. One
never knows, but we may see them soon enough.
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